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Joseph Sax and the Idea of
the Public Trust
Carol M. Rose*
"Public trust": what an arresting phrase. Perhaps it is not quite
the equal of "the tragedy of the commons,"l but it catches the atten-
tion in a far more positive way, with its intimations of guardianship,
responsibility, and community. My task here is to show how Joseph
Sax deployed this evocative phrase, and expanded the concepts be-
hind it, to challenge our ideas about natural resource management.
For reasons that I hope will become clear, I find that I cannot deal
with this task independently of the other topics on the panel-public
lands policy to some degree, the takings question to a greater degree,
but most of all water law, where the public trust is, if I may use the
phrase, deeply immersed.
First, what is the public trust as a legal matter? Until it was re-
vived and re-invented by Sax, the doctrine held that some resources,
particularly lands beneath navigable waters or washed by the tides,
are either inherently the property of the public at large, or are at least
subject to a kind of inherent easement for certain public purposes.2
Those purposes are foremost navigation and travel, to a lesser extent
fishing, and lesser still recreation and public gatherings.3 This set of
notions first appeared in Roman law and has floated through English
and now American law.4 In England, the public trust doctrine bobbed
up in some of the seventeenth century debates over royal preroga-
tive;5 it made another appearance in some American tidelands cases
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1. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
2. See Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical
Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 12, 14 (1976).
3. See id.; Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional
Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-64 (1970); Jan S. Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's
Ancient Prerogative Becomes the People's Environmental Right, 14 D.C. DAVIS L. REV.
195, 222 (1980). See also Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Com-
merce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 778 (1986) (for the exten-
sion of a version of the "trust" to public meeting spaces-"public forums").
4. See Rose, Commedy of the Commons, supra note 3, at 727-30 (for a capsule
history).
5. See Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law,
3 FLA. ST. L. REV. 511, 559-62 (1975).
351
HeinOnline -- 25 Ecology L.Q. 352 1998-1999
352 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 25:351
before the Civil War;6 and it got a major boost from the Supreme
Court in 1892 in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.7 For a few de-
cades after Illinois Central, a flurry of state waterway cases used the
concept. In later decades these public trust cases subsided, though
they never entirely vanished.8
Joseph Sax's 1970 article, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resources Law9 , ushered in the next and most recent major revival of
the public trust concept. Sax returned to the old but persistent legal
idea-that at least some resources or properties are especially subject
to public claims-but unhooked it from its traditional moorings on or
around water bodies and applied it to dry land as well. He himself has
referred to the concept of the pubic trust in his discussions of the tak-
ings doctrine,IO historical and cultural resources,l1 and a variety of
ecological resources.12 More than that, simply by dusting off this
venerable phrase, Sax's Public Trust Doctrine article added a power-
ful, if controversial, rhetorical element to the discussion of these re-
source areas.
One way to understand Sax's version of the public trust is to
think back to the time that Sax wrote the article. Published in 1970,
the Public Trust Doctrine appeared between two major articles that
Sax wrote on the subject of takings-one published in 196413 and the
6. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842); Arnoldv. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1,
71-78 (N.J. 1821).
7. 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (negating the privatization of the Chicago waterfront).
8. Sax, for example, used post-Illinois Central cases from Wisconsin and California in
his seminal article, Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH L. REV. 471, 509-46 (1970) [hereinafter Sax, The
Public Trust Doctrine]. For developments in Florida, see Michael L. Rosen, Public and
Private Ownership Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters: The Governmental/Proprie-
tary Distinction, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 561,588-610 (1982).
9. See Sax, The Public Trust, supra note 8.
10. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
155,155 n.16, 171 (1971) [hereinafter Sax, Takings, Private Property].
11. See Joseph L. Sax, Is Anyone Minding Stonehenge? The Origins of Cultural Prop-
erty Protection in England, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1558 (1990).
12. Contemporaneously with his Michigan article, Sax made a quite expansive state-
ment of the trust's reach in popular form in the chapter The Public Trust: A New Charter
of Environmental Rights, in JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 158, 172
(1971) (describing trust as applicable to air, water, congestion, noise, natural areas, pesti-
cides, radioactivity and environmental problems generally). See also Joseph L. Sax, The
Constitution, Property Rights and the Future 'of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257, 269-
70 (1990) (mentioning use of public trust to protect fisheries and riparian ecosystems);
Joseph L. Sax, The Search for Environmental Rights, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 93, 105
(1990) (arguing that private ownership in "natural endowment of water, soil, and
air ... should be considered subordinate to the public trust obligation" to maintain genetic
stock, biodiversity, and undiminished productive capacity).
13. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J, 36 (1964) [hereinafter
Sax, Police Power].
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other in 1971.1 4 In his 1964 article, Takings and the Police Power, Sax
posited a "good guy/bad guy" view of governmental regulation. In the
good guy regulation, government acted in an "arbitrage" mode, set-
tling disputes among more or less equally situated property owners.
In the bad guy scenario, government acted in an "enterprise" mode,
regulating in order to press private individuals' property into public
service.l5 In some ways, this analysis recalled an older view ofregula-
tion, distinguishing [good] nuisance-preventing regulation from [bad]
public-benefit-providing regulation16-an analysis that has never been
precisely delineated, but that has always had a residuum of common
sense appealP It is essentially an analysis of takings that reflects a
concern about majority over-reaching at the expense of minority
rights.
But by the time of his second takings article in 1971, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, Sax was much more impressed by
the fragility of majority governance and the corresponding need to
bolster majority rule to solve environmental problems. It was this set
of concerns that appeared not only in the second takings article-
where Sax found more latitude for governmental action vis-a-vis pri-
vate property18-but also in the Public Trust Doctrine article. What
accounted for the difference in the intervening decade? One set of
factors was pragmatic: the later years of the 1960s saw the beginnings
of modern environmentalism. As he was working on the public trust
article, Sax himself was also heavily engaged in developing a state en-
vironmental protection act for the state of Michigan.19
Just as important were intellectual factors: the decade also saw
important shifts in theories of government. A new "public choice"
analysis argued that sharply focused minority interests could often get
their way in legislatures at the expense of diffuse majorities2°-and
14. Sax, Takings, Private Property, supra note 10.
15. See Sax, Police Power, supra note 13, at 62-64 (distinguishing arbitrage and enter-
prise roles).
16. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 (1904).
17. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules,
and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L REV. 681, 728-33 (1973) (basing compensa-
tion vel non on the ordinary understanding of nuisance-like or "subnormal" character of
the activity regulated).
18. See Thomas W. Merrill, Compensation and the Interconnectedness of Property, 25
ECOLOGY L. Q. 327.
19. Sax described some of the results in Joseph L. Sax & Joseph F. DiMento, Environ-
mental Citizen Suits: Three Years' Experience Under the Michigan Environmental Protec-
tion Act, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1974); Joseph L. Sax & Roger L. Conner, Michigan's
Environmental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1003 (1972).
20. Among the important early works were JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TUL-
LOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962) and MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLEC-
TIVE ACTION (1965). For a perspective on Olson's work in particular, see Daniel A.
Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1565 (1995). For the
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what could be more diffuse than environmental concerns? Mean-
while, in the administrative arena, "capture" theorists described the
similar ways that regulated interests could take over the very public
agencies that supposedly regulated them. Significantly, Phillip Foss's
Politics and Grass,2l a seminal book for capture theory, was published
at the beginning of the decade. This book described the takeover of
federal grazing councils by local grazing interests and had considera-
ble influence on environmentalists interested in the management of
the public lands.
All of these factors combined to suggest that in environmental
matters the most serious problem was not overbearing majoritarian-
ism, but rather the weakness and incompetence of majority rule vis-a-
vis focused minority interests. With respect to the environment, ma-
jority government needed not just more managerial authority, but bet-
ter informed and more flexible management to empower it against
private stakeholders' importuning. In an effort to address this di-
lemma, Sax drew upon the property area in which he developed an
early expertise: water law.22
Water law in general is a fount of doctrine for public resource
management, since water is indeed a diffuse resource with a long his-
tory of community management. As Sax has stressed in subsequent
years, water rights have always had some elements of communal man-
agement and responsiveness to change "built in," as it were.23 Unlike
land, water's development, use, and transfer unambiguously implicate
many other users and types of use, and thus the legal regimes for
water rights have tended to evolve in such ways as to incorporate
greater concern for diversity and changes in use. Historically, the
public trust doctrine has been only a small part of water law, but Sax's
discussions often seem to have in mind not so much the fairly specific
doctrine of public trust as the larger picture of water law, with its long
history of public management and readjustments.24
influence of this literature on Sax's work on the takings doctrine, see generally Merrill,
supra note 18.
21. PHILLIP O. Foss, POLITICS AND GRASS (1960).
22. By the time of the public trust article, Sax had published his casebook, WATER
LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1968) [hereinafter Sax, WATER
LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY]. For an even earlier typescript volume, see JOSEPH L. SAX,
WATER LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY (1965).
23. See Joseph L. Sax, Rights that "Inhere in the Title Itself': The Impact of the Lucas
Case on Western Water Law, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 943, 944, 950-51 (1993) (Water law
delineates rights as subject to public constraints and changing circumstances.); Joseph L.
Sax, The Limits of Private Rights in Public Waters, 19 ENVTL. L. 473, 482 (1989) (Water
rights are always subject to public limits and change.).
24. When Sax has cited the public trust doctrine, he has often done so in the context
of other water law principles. See, e.g., supra note 12 and sources cited therein.
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Just as Sax has often generalized the flexibility of water law prin-
ciples, so too has he generalized the concept of the public trust, using
this vivid phrase as a vehicle for insisting that public bodies pay atten-
tion to-and adequately vindicate-the changing public interest in
diffuse resources. In particular, in his 1970 Public Trust Doctrine arti-
cle, Sax effectively treated the public trust as a common-law version of
the then-novel "hard look" doctrine for environmental impacts. Ac-
cording to Sax's analysis, the public trust doctrine required the collec-
tion of adequate information, public participation in decisions,
informed and accountable choices, and close scrutiny of private give-
aways of environmental resources.25
Nine years later, Sax seemed to change focus when he described
the task as one of "liberating" the trust from its "historical shackles."
There, he argued that the public trust should become a tool for avoid-
ing destabilizing change and for incorporating community values in
decisions about social as well as ecological resources.26 Despite the
apparent differences in these depictions of the trust, however, they
may be closer than they seem: in subsequent years, we have learned
how the "hard look" doctrine can be used by community groups to
delay change. These two versions of the trust, taken together, suggest
that Sax's goal was to loosen the public trust doctrine from its histori-
cal connection with navigation and waterways, and turn the doctrine
instead into a more general device for managing change and recogniz-
ing community values in diffuse resources.
While other authors diverged in a number of ways from Sax's vi-
sion of the public trust, many followed his lead in generalizing the
concept beyond its historic confines, using the idea of the public trust
to discuss not only traditional waterways, but also upland beaches,27
water policy more generally,2s public lands management,29 wildlife,3°
ecological resources in genera1,31 and of course the takings issue.32
Sax's revival and expansion of the public trust doctrine, however,
was not without its critics. Though the general concept, and Sax's arti-
25. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 8, at 557-65.
26. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles, 14 D.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980).
27. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 3 (applying public trust doctrine to beaches).
28. See, e.g., Symposium on the Public Trust and the Waters of the American West, 19
ENvrL. L. 1 (1989).
29. See, e.g., Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14
D.C. DAVIS L. REV. 269 (1980) (attempting to use public trust as source of public land
law).
30. See, e.g., Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doc-
trine to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723 (1989).
31. See, e.g., Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An
Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 393 (1991).
32. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 3 (using public trust for public claims over beach).
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cle in particular, were widely cited in cases and subsequent scholar-
ship, the doctrine itself remained vague.33 Was it a substantive
doctrine about resources with particular public elements? If so, how
was one to distinguish "public trust" resources from others? Or was it
a procedural theory of governance, and if so, to which subjects did its
enhanced theories apply?34 Was it, as even some environmentalist
critics suggested, a misguided effort to dredge up ancient flotsam in a
way that obscures contemporary environmental issues instead of illu-
minating them?35 Or finally, as some property rights proponents ar-
gued, was the verbiage about the "public trust" merely a rhetorical
shield for still further public depredations on private property?36
Perhaps less obvious than some of the other nagging issues about
the public trust-but no less central-was a question that echoed a
nineteenth century concern about the doctrine: was the public trust in
some sense property? That is, do resources impressed with the public
trust in some sense belong to the public in such a way that the public's
property claims override the acts of its own agents, even the legisla-
ture? In the nineteenth century, this issue was framed in terms of the
alienability of public trust property, and it was quite hotly debated.
New Jersey courts represented one view, declaring that the public
trust was indeed the public's property, inalienable even through legis-
lative acts. New York courts took the opposite position-altered only
after the 1892 Illinois Central case seemed to support the New Jersey
view-that the legislature was the sovereign representative of the
public at large, and as such could act in the public's name, even to
alienate trust property.3?
33. See Rose, Comedy of the Commons, supra note 3, at 722 (describing vagueness of
cases' and articles' descriptions of public trust).
34. The public trust as a doctrine for promoting representative government is ex-
plored-but ultimately rejected-in William D. Araiza, Democracy, Distrust and the Public
Trust: Process-Based Constitutional Theory, the Public Trust Doctrine and the Search for a
Substantive Environmental Value, 45 UCLA L. REV. 385, 413-33 (1997). See also A. Dan
Tarlock, Book Review, 47 IND. L.J. 406, 412 (1972) (reviewing JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING
THE ENVIRONMENT (1971» ("The public trust theory, which expresses one simple idea, is
not a general theory of resource allocation.").
35. See, e.g., Steven M. Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffec-
tive-And Undesirable-Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 467-70, 487-88 (1982)
(arguing that the public trust concept is not useful with respect to pUblic lands, does not
give needed specific guidance to courts, and that specific statutes are preferable); Richard
J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions ofProperty and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Ques-
tioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 715-16 (1986) (public trust doctrine
a "step backward toward a bygone era").
36. See, e.g., James L. Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527 (1989) (arguing that the public trust doctrine
is an effort to evade just compensation).
37. See Rose, Commedy of the Commons, supra note 3, at 735-39 (describing different
views).
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In his 1970 Public Trust Doctrine article, Sax took the early New
York position: he refused to treat the public trust doctrine as confer-
ring property rights on the general public as distinct from the legisla-
ture.38 There were good reasons for this, both as a general matter and
for Sax's purposes in particular. First, a trust-based public property
right would mean that the unorganized public could trump its own
legislature's acts, implying that the public trust was some sort of an
informal constitutional right, something certainly outside normal
American legal practice. But for Sax, a second reason may have been
more important: he was most urgently concerned with extending and
improving the public management of diffuse environmental resources.
Looking toward that end, Sax evidently thought that a "property"
framework for the public trust would act as a constraint on legislatures
where expansion was required, and would add a note of rigidity where
flexibility was warranted. Hence Sax was willing to leave ultimate
control of the public trust in legislative hands, since ultimately the
public can only successfully manage the complex issues of environ-
mental protection through its representatives.
Other scholars, however, have argued that Sax's use of the public
trust did establish some sort of property rights in the public at large,
however much Sax may have bridled at the idea.39 Subsequent ver-
sions of the public trust, incorporating the property notion of the doc-
trine, have taken directions with interesting parallels to and
divergences from Sax's original concern with managing change and
involving the public in decisionmaking over diffuse environmental re-
sources. I describe here three such scholarly directions, not chrono-
logically, but in an order that elucidates some of the salient features of
Sax's original ideas.
Richard Epstein seems to have picked up on the "property" no-
tion of the public trust precisely for the reasons that made Sax ner-
vous: in its property incarnation, the public trust doctrine does imply
constraints on legislatures. Epstein has likened the public trust doc-
trine to the takings doctrine that protects private property. Both doc-
trines, he argues, represent the idea that property puts bounds on
legislatures, preventing them from colluding with the various "rent-
seekers" who attempt to use the political process to redistribute the
wealth of others to themselves.40 If the public trust represents prop-
38. See Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, supra note 8, at 478-84.
39. See, e.g., Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James B. Wadley, The Common Lands Con-
cept: A "Commons" Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 361, 377-79 (1974) (arguing that Sax's position implies a property right in the public);
Daniel R. Coquillette, Muses from an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Prop-
erty Cases about the Environment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 761, 811-13 (1979) (criticizing Sax's
argument against a public property view of the trust).
40. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 418-21 (1987).
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erty belonging to the public, inalienable by their purported agents in
the legislature (or alienable only under sharp restrictions), then Ep-
stein argues that the doctrine's true function is to restrain legislators
from giving away the store for private gain to the general detriment of
the public at large.41 While the Epstein view seems remarkably
"green" for him-representing the idea that the public can have prop-
erty-he nevertheless has managed to massage the doctrine into a
shape that fits his general antipathy to legislative politics and his will-
ingness to find judicial remedies to control those politics.42
Interestingly, Epstein's anti rent-seeking cast on the public trust
doctrine may have some historical verification, and may also accord
with some of Sax's concerns. From quite different directions, Louise
Halper and William Fischel, in their respective investigations of late
nineteenth century nuisance law and eminent domain doctrine, have
described how the courts drew distinctions in these doctrinal areas to
rein in the most egregious legislative giveaways of the day, particularly
those that benefitted railway companies.43 Certainly one could make
a convincing argument that the Supreme Court's Illinois Central deci-
sion, the famous 1892 revival of the public trust doctrine in the context
of a public giveaway to a railroad, sprang from much the same im-
pulse. Indeed, control of rent-seeking is not far removed from at least
a few of Sax's own desiderata for environmental management in 1971.
The problem with this property version of the public trust, however, is
that while it may serve the negative function of restraining legislative
giveaways, it does little to empower public agencies or impel them
towards responsible management. For Sax, that was not enough.
A second use of the property version of the public trust is as a
governmental defense against takings claims. If the public trust doc-
trine means that the public owns an easement in trust lands, this argu-
ment goes, then private property within the trust area is purchased
subject to trust uses, and private owners need not be compensated for
regulations that maintain public trust purposes. A trace of this idea
appeared in Just v. Marinette County, a Wisconsin case refusing to
compensate an owner on his "takings" claim against wetlands protec-
41. [d.
42. For a discussion (and critique) of Epstein's jaundiced view of legislatures as par-
ticularly prone to rent-seeking and of his reliance on judicial control of legislatures, see
Thomas W. Merrill, Rent-Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561,
1583-90 (1987) (reviewing RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985».
43. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLI-
TICS 88-94 (1995) (describing alterations in eminent domain law to broaden compensation
to owners near urban railways); Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the
New York Court of Appeal, 1850-1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 319-20, 328 (1990) (same in
nuisance law).
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tion legislation.44 The view appeared again more forcefully in some
other state cases disposing of private property claims against public
regulation of waterfront areas.45 This use of the public trust as a tak-
ings defense, of course, has outraged property rights proponents.46 A
1995 proposed antitakings bill in Montana, for example, specifically
referred to the public trust doctrine and would have nullified its use as
a defense against takings claims.47
Interestingly, Sax was less certain about this defensive use of the
trust idea in his 1968 casebook on water law,48 and he even anticipated
an idea, later articulated by my co-panelist Buzz Thompson, that judi-
cial decisions vindicating the public's "trust" rights might require com-
pensation as takings from private owners.49 But in a sense, the use of
the public trust as a takings defense is quite in line with Sax's desire to
protect diffuse resources. As the analysis of public choice theory sug-
gests, private property owners have very focused wishes for their
property, and they may often out-shout the widely-but-shallowly-felt
interests in, say, wetlands protection or endangered species preserva-
tion. The difficulty lies in the old question of definition: just what
properties count as "impressed with a public trust" for purposes of
takings defenses and why? Unfortunately, cases and commentators
on the public trust have been uncomfortably vague about its reach.50
Still another take on the property version of the public trust is
one that I have explored, though I must confess that rather few have
followed suit. Several years ago, I looked at the doctrine historically
and found that it was only one of several that supported the idea that
some property inherently belongs to the public.51 The main thrust of
these "inherent public property" doctrines, however, was not particu-
larly aimed at preserving resources that we generally denote as envi-
ronmental. Instead, the key feature of these doctrines was to reserve
for the public those properties that the public needs for travel, com-
munication, commerce, and to some degree public speaking-that is,
uses that connect people with one another and with a wider world and
44. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
45. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(water), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1065 (1983); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362
(Cal. 1980) (tidelands), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); Matthews v. Bay Head Improve-
ment Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984) (tidelands).
46. See, e.g., Huffman, supra note 36 (public trust an evasion of compensation duty).
47. See H.R. 597, 54th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. § 3(8) (Mont. 1995) (this private property
protection act was not enacted).
48. See Sax, WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY, supra note 22, at 304.
49. [d.; See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REv. 1449 (arguing
that alterations in judicial doctrine may constitute takings).
50. See, e.g., Matthews, 471 A.2d at 365 (pUblic trust is "flexible"); Sax, The Public
Trust Doctrine, supra note 8, at 556-57; Wilkinson, supra note 29, at 315 (1980).
51. See Rose, Commedy of the Commons, supra note 3, at 711-14.
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allow all to interact in a social whole.52 In this context, the public trust
doctrine only indirectly relates to environmental resources-perhaps
insofar as recreation, the experience of natural wonders, and the pres-
ervation of biodiversity act as a part of a liberal education, promote
public health (including mental health), and generally enable people
to interact with one another more productively and civilly.53 These
environmental concerns are not inconsiderable matters, and they are
certainly related to traditional public trust thinking. But it may be
that much stronger modern echoes of the public trust doctrine can be
heard elsewhere: in discussions of public claims to use communica-
tions media freely-notably the internet, where a current debate rages
over the degree to which intellectual property should lock the doors
on information transfer.54
Interestingly, it now appears that a rather different, older prop-
erty doctrine might have more directly targeted Sax's environmental
concerns. Indeed, it is a doctrine that Sax undoubtedly knew well,
especially since, as I suggest above, he often seemed to use the lan-
guage of the public trust doctrine when he actually had in mind more
general water law concepts. The set of water law doctrines known as
riparianism, though long dismissed as antiquated, may now be emerg-
ing as a particularly helpful model for ecological management.
The heyday of riparian law was the nineteenth century, in the
early days of industrialization. The problem that this body of law ad-
dressed, briefly, was to assure that river water could drive watermills
all the way down a river's length, while allowing watermills to con-
sume some very modest amount of water due to millpond seepage and
the like.55 Notice that this is the pattern typical of modern environ-
mental problems: to preserve the bulk of a renewable resource, while
permitting very modest uses at the fringes, as it were, compatible with
the preservation of the whole. The riparian solution to this problem
52. See Id. at 770, 774-81.
53. Id. at 779-81.
54. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED MAG., Jan. 1996, at 135
(decrying proposals to over-propertize materials on internet); see generally Carol M. Rose,
The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Eco-
systems (forthcoming MINN. L. REv. 1998) (describing property/commons debate in cyber-
space and environmental law).
55. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (1988); Carol M.
Rose, Riparian Rights, in 3 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
344 (Peter Newman, ed., 1998); Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment
of Common-Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 290-93 (1990). See also A. Dan
Tarlock, New Water Transfer Restrictions: The West Returns to Riparianism, 27 WATER
RESOURCES RESEARCH 987 (1991); A. Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of
Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (1997); A. Dan Tarlock,
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had several parts. First, it limited the use of river water to riverbank
owners, prohibiting inter-basin transfer and thus effectively turning
the river water into a property common to the bank owners while ex-
cluding all others. Second, within this group of water users, each was
allocated a modest claim, limited to "reasonable use"-a minor use
compatible with similar consumptive claims by all other users and
with the untouched preservation of the bulk of the river resource.56
This was a judge-made solution to a complex problem of interac-
tive uses of a renewable resource. It aimed at protecting industrial
uses rather than environmental ones, and it was not notably helpful in
dealing with issues of pollution or fisheries management. But in out-
line, riparian law included the basic structural features of modern en-
vironmental management: it capped the total permissible use of the
river water at a level that allowed regeneration of the underlying re-
source, and within that capped amount it allocated individually per-
mitted quotas.
Such an approach-allowing some use, while preserving the bulk
(in trust terms, the res) for renewal-sets the pattern for the modern
management of air and water pollution, fish and wildlife catches, the
production of greenhouse gases, and nearly every other environmen-
tal problem concerning renewable resources.57 Modern environmen-
tal statutes for tradeable emission rights or individually transferrable
fishing quotas reflect the basic riparian structure of limiting total use
while permitting modest individual uses, even though they have vastly
more sophisticated methods for allocating individual quotas and in
particular for transferring individual quotas, a feature disallowed in
riparian law.58
I conclude with two further observations, both concerning Sax's
use of analogy and metaphor. First, I have argued elsewhere that if
water instead of land were our dominant metaphor for property, we
would have a quite different law of property.59 On re-reading so
many of Joe Sax's articles, I think that I should have cited him for that
proposition. In his work on the public trust, he has tried to educate
the rest of us in the ways that water law concepts might make a differ-
ence to our attitudes about property and environmental resources.60
56. See Rose, Riparian Rights, supra note 55, at 345.
57. See id. at 345-46. See also Carol M. Rose, The Evolution of Property Rights, 3
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman, ed., 1998).
58. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 8-9 (1991) (describing
marketable permit systems).
59. See Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
329, 351 (1996).
60. See generally Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 363.
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The public trust doctrine by no means represents the only such water
law concept-since riparian law seems at least equally significant-
but it is certainly the one with the best name.
This relates to the second point: One has to suspect that the real
problem with riparian law as a model for environmental management
is that it has such a nondescript and uncharismatic name-quite unlike
"the public trust." I have also argued elsewhere that the environ-
mentalist case hinges not only on the physical resources that are so
important and evocative in themselves, but also on the rhetorical re-
sources that are available to us, however imperfect those may be.61
And once again, in re-reading so many of Sax's contributions, I see
now that I should have cited him for that proposition as well, because
of the way he highlighted and re-deployed the charismatic moniker of
the "public trust." It is a tribute not only to Sax's arguments, but also
to his masterful use of the rhetorical resources implicit in the name,
that the "public trust in natural resources" is now so well-known and
so widely referenced in our current debate on the management of nat-
ural resources.
61. See Carol M. Rose, Environmental Lessons, 27 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1023, 1040-47
(1994); Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of Economic Meph-
istopheles, or, Value By Any Other Name is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1642-46
(1989) (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988».
